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Modelling natural action selection: An introduction to the theme issue 
Tony J. Prescott, Joanna J. Bryson, Anil K. Seth 
 
Summary  
Action selection is the task of resolving conflicts between competing behavioural alternatives. 
This theme issue is dedicated to advancing our understanding of the behavioural patterns and 
neural substrates supporting action selection in animals, including humans. The scope of 
problems investigated includes (i) whether biological action selection is optimal (and, if so, what 
is optimised), (ii) the neural substrates for action selection in the vertebrate brain, (iii) the role of 
perceptual selection in decision-making, and (iv) the interaction of group and individual action 
selection. A second aim of this issue is to advance methodological practice with respect to 
modelling natural action section. A wide variety of computational modelling techniques are 
therefore employed ranging from formal mathematical approaches through to computational 
neuroscience, connectionism and agent-based modelling.  The research described has broad 
implications for both the natural and artificial sciences. One example, highlighted here, is its 
application to medical science where models of the neural substrates for action selection are 
contributing to the understanding brain disorders such as ParkinsonÕs disease and attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. 
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Action selection is the task of resolving conflicts between competing behavioural alternatives, or, 
more simply put, of deciding Ôwhat to do nextÕ. As a general problem facing all autonomous 
beingsÑanimals and artificial agentsÑit has exercised the minds of scientists from many 
disciplines: those concerned with understanding the biological bases of behaviour (ethology, 
neurobiology, psychology); and those with building artifacts, real or simulated, that behave 
appropriately in complex worlds (artificial intelligence, artificial life, and robotics).  Work in 
these different domains has established a wide variety of methodologies that address the same 
underlying problems from different perspectives. One approach to characterizing this multiplicity 
of methods is to distinguish between the analytical and synthetic branches of the behavioural and 
brain sciences (Braitenberg, 1986).  From the perspective of analytical science, an important goal 
is to describe transitions in behaviour, these can occur at many different temporal scales, and can 
be considered as instances of Ôbehavioural switchingÕ, or, more anthropomorphically, as Ôchoice 
pointsÕ. Analytical approaches also seek to identify the biological substrates that give rise to such 
transitions, for instance, by probing in the nervous system to find critical componentsÑcandidate 
action-selection mechanismsÑon which effective and appropriate switching may depend.  
Beyond such descriptions, of course, a central goal of behavioural science is to explain why any 
observed transition (or sequence of transitions) occurs in a given context, perhaps referencing 
such explanation to normative concepts such as ÔutilityÕ or ÔfitnessÕ. These explanations may also 
make use of mechanistic accounts that explain how underlying neural control systems operate to 
generate observed behavioural outcomes. It is at the confluence of these mechanistic and 
normative approaches that the synthetic approach in science is coming to have an increasing 
influence. The experimentalist seeks the help of the mathematician or engineer and asks Òwhat 
would it take to build a system that acts in this way?Ó   
ModellingÑthe synthesis of artificial systems that mimic natural onesÑhas always played 
an important role in biology; however, the last few decades have seen a dramatic expansion in the 
range of modelling methodologies that have been employed. Formal, mathematical models with 
provable properties continue to be of great importance (see e.g. Houston, McNamara, & Steer, 
this issue; Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, this issue). Now, added to these, there is a 
burgeoning interest in larger-scale simulations that allow the investigation of systems for which 
formal mathematical solutions are, as a result of their complexity, either intractable or simply 
unknown. However, synthetic models, once built, may often be elucidated by analytical 
techniques, thus synthetic and analytic approaches are best pursued jointly. Analysis of a 
formally-intractable simulation often consists of observing the systemÕs behaviour then 
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measuring and describing it using many of the same tools as traditional experimental science (see 
Bryson, Ando, & Lehmann, this issue). Such analysis can serve to uncover heuristics for the 
interpretation of empirical data as well as to generate novel hypotheses to be tested 
experimentally. 
The questions to be addressed in considering models of action selection include: Is the 
model sufficiently constrained by biological data that its functioning can capture interesting 
properties of the natural system of interest? Do manipulations of the model, intended to mirror 
scientific procedures or observed natural processes, result in similar outcomes to those seen in 
real life?  Does the model make predictions?  Is the model more complex than it needs to be in 
order to describe a phenomenon, or is it too simple to engage with empirical data?  A potential 
pitfall of more detailed computational models is that they may trade the sophistication with which 
they match biological detail with comprehensibility. The scientist is then left with two systems, 
one natural, one synthesized, neither of which is well understood.  Hence, the best models hit 
upon a good trade-off between accurately mimicking key properties of a target biological system 
at the same time as remaining understandable to the extent that new insights into the natural 
world are generated.  
In this theme issue we present a selection of some of the most promising contemporary 
approaches to modelling action selection in natural systems.  The range of methodologies is 
broadÑfrom formal mathematical models, through to models of artificial animals, here called 
agents, embedded in simulated worlds (often containing other agents). We also consider 
mechanistic accounts of the neural processes underlying action selection through a variety of 
computational neuroscience and connectionist approaches.   In the present introductory article, 
we summarize the main substantive areas of this theme issue and the contributions of each article, 
then return briefly to a discussion of the modelling techniques. 
 
Action selection and optimality 
When an animal does one thing rather than another, it is natural to ask Ôwhy?Õ.  A common 
explanation is that the action is optimal with respect to some goal.  For example, when observing 
the foraging behaviour of a shorebird, one may ask whether the intake of food is being 
maximized. This view, a direct extension of Darwinian principles, has its more recent roots in 
behavioural ecology (Krebs & Davies, 1997) and optimal foraging theory (Stephens & Krebs, 
1986). Assessing animal behaviour from a normative perspective has particular value when 
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observations deviate from predictions, because the scientist is now forced to consider the origin 
of the apparently suboptimalÑor ÔirrationalÕÑbehaviour.   
Many animals behave according to HerrnsteinÕs (1961) Ômatching lawÕ, in which responses 
are allocated in proportion to the reward obtained from each response.  However, as both Houston 
et al (this issue) and Seth (this issue) note, matching is not always optimal.  One response to this 
observation is to propose that suboptimal matching arises as a side-effect of some underlying 
principle of behaviour, such as ThorndikeÕs (1911) Ôlaw of effectÕ  which proposes that behaviour 
shifts towards alternatives that have higher immediate value. Another is given by the notion of 
ecological rationalityÑthat cognitive mechanisms fit the demands of particular ecological niches 
and may deliver predictably suboptimal behaviour when operating outside these niches 
(Gigerenzer, Todd, et al., 1999). In line with ecological rationality, Seth (this issue) shows that 
simple decision rules, that lead to optimal foraging in competitive environments with multiple 
foragers, also lead individual foragers to obey the matching law. 
As Houston et al. (this issue) discuss, a further possible explanation of apparent 
irrationality is that we were wrong about what is being optimized. As an example, they consider 
violations of transitivity, showing that such violations can in fact be optimal when decisions are 
state-dependent and when choice options persist into the future. Another axiom of standard 
rationality is independence from irrelevant alternatives, the notion that the relative preference of 
one option over another is unaffected by the inclusion of further options into the choice set.  
However, as Houston et al. show, adding a suboptimal option can affect future expectations 
because, assuming that decision-making errors happen, the suboptimal option is likely to be 
wrongly chosen in the future. Apparent violations of rationality in human decision making are 
also discussed by Bogacz et al. (this issue, see below). 
A related way we can be mistaken about what is optimized is when behaviour reflects 
compromises among multiple goals. As Crabbe (this issue) explains, a compromise action is 
defined as an action that, while not necessarily best suited to satisfying any goal in isolation, may 
be the best when all goals are taken into account. For example, a predator stalking two birds 
might not move directly towards either one of the birds, but in between the two, hedging its bets 
in case one of the birds elects to fly away. This article provides a review of approaches to 
compromise behaviour in relevant literatures finding that, whilst the intuition that compromise is 
useful is widespread, the data from empirical studies to support this assertion is rather thin. 
Crabbe then presents a series of detailed models directly addressing the question of when 
compromise behaviour is optimal. The models are restricted to simple situations involving both 
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prescriptive (e.g., food) and proscriptive (e.g., danger areas) goals, but are both spatially explicit 
and open to analytical investigation. The methodology used is distinctive inasmuch as it combines 
agent-based modelling with a formal analysis of optimal strategies.  Perhaps surprisingly, Crabbe 
finds that compromise behaviour is usually of little benefit in the scenarios analyzed.  He suggests 
the interesting proposal that while this may be true for so-called 'low-level' compromise behavior 
(e.g., motor actions), it may be less true for 'high-level' compromise, in which the compromise is 
among competing behaviours (e.g., get food, find shelter) that are less easily 'blended'.  
 
Neural substrates for action selection in cortico-basal ganglia loops 
A central and largely unsolved problem in the brain sciences is to understand the functional 
architecture of the vertebrate nervous system. Many questions about this architecture revolve 
around the issue of action selection.  Because it is a fundamental property of neurons to be 
selective with regard to the patterns of input activity to which they respond, claims that particular 
brain sub-systems are specifically or preferentially involved in the selection of action, as distinct 
to other aspects of control, must meet more stringent requirements (see below). It is also by no 
means inevitable that the functional decomposition of the brain will contain specialist action-
selection mechanisms (see Seth, this issue). Appropriate behavioural switching could be a global 
property of nervous system function, and of its embedding in a body and environment, that 
cannot be attributed to specific sub-components of brain architecture. In other words, it is 
plausible that an animal may ÔflipÕ from one integrated pattern of behavioural output to another 
without some identifiable internal ÔswitchÕ being thrown. On the other hand, theoretical 
arguments can be presented, based for instance on the benefits that accrue from modularity 
(Wagner & Altenberg, 1996; Prescott, Redgrave, & Gurney, 1999; Bryson, 2005), to suggest that 
biological control systems may include specialized action-selection components.  Hence, one 
important debate in this field is whether there are specialized mechanisms for action selection in 
animal nervous systems, and, if so, where these might be found (see also Prescott, in press, for an 
evolutionary perspective on this question).  
Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney, (1999) have proposed that, to be considered as a candidate 
action-selection mechanism, a neural sub-system should exhibit the following properties. First, it 
should have inputs that carry information about both internal and external cues relevant to 
decision making. Second, there should be some internal mechanism that allows calculation of the 
urgency or ÔsalienceÕ that should be attached each available action. Third, there should be 
mechanisms that allow for the resolution of conflicts between competing actions based on their 
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relative salience. Finally, the outputs of the system should be configured so as to allow the 
expression of winning actions whilst disallowing losers. There is now a growing consensus in the 
neuroscience literature that the basal gangliaÑa group of functionally-related structures found in 
the mid- and forebrain of all vertebratesÑmeet these criteria and therefore may represent an 
important neural action-selection substrate.   
A key characteristic of the basal ganglia is its connectivity, in the form of multiple parallel 
loops, with both cortical and sub-cortical systems involved in either the control of movement, 
planning, or in the sequencing of thought. Houk et al. (this issue) characterise these loops as 
Ôdistributed processing modulesÕ implementing an action-selection function and contrast them 
with loops via the cerebellum, whose complementary role is to refine and amplify selected 
commands. The idea of cortico-basal ganglia loops as a substrate for action selection is a 
consistent theme in the computational neuroscience models described in this issue (Cisek, this 
issue; Frank, Sherman, & Scheres, this issue; Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, this issue; Stafford & 
Gurney, this issue). However, there are also important differences in emphasis, and in the precise 
functional characterisation of the role of the basal ganglia, among these contributions.  For 
instance, Hazey et al. and Frank et al. share a common starting point in adopting a model of basal 
ganglia function that stresses the differential role of two intrinsic basal ganglia pathwaysÑone 
monosynaptic (sometimes termed the ÔdirectÕ pathway) that inhibits basal ganglia output 
structures, and another di-synaptic (or ÔindirectÕ) that has a net-excitatory effect on outputs.  
According to these authors the first pathway provides a ÒgoÓ signal that allows (gates) a desired 
movement by suppressing basal ganglia inhibition of target structures, while the second pathway 
is Òno-goÓ, preventing the performance of an undesired movement. The same pathways (along 
with others) are also represented in the Stafford and Gurney model in this issue, however these 
authors emphasize the synergistic operation of intrinsic basal ganglia mechanisms that results in 
an appropriate balance of basal ganglia output to both winning and losing channels.  Whilst the 
differences between these alternative accounts can seem relatively subtle, the fact that they are 
fully-specified computationally means that they have the capacity to generate different 
predictions to be investigated and tested against empirical data (Gurney, Prescott, Wickens, & 
Redgrave, 2004). 
A significant focus of current debate is on the balance between intrinsic basal ganglia 
mechanisms and extrinsic mechanisms elsewhere in the brain in deciding what actions are 
selected. For Cisek (this issue), the selection of visually-guided reaching movements within 
primate fronto-parietal cortex depends largely upon intra-cortical mechanisms, inhibitory and 
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excitatory, with the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex acting to bias this selection process. 
Beginning with the traditional distinction between the dorsal (ÒwhereÓ) and ventral (ÒwhatÓ) 
cortical processing streams, Cisek argues that the dorsal stream contains specialized sub-streams 
each configured to meet the needs of alternative forms of action.  At any one moment several 
action plans may be active, triggered by the opportunities afforded by the current 
task/environment context.  This view emphasises that the specification of action, that is the 
computation of the parameters of movement, can occur alongside the selection of action and 
possibly within the same neural substrate.  Modelling results support this hypothesis that intra-
cortical mechanisms may be sufficient to resolve the competition between active action 
representations to provide a clear winner.  
Houk et al. (this issue) describe two empirical studies whose inspiration has also been 
modelling of the neural substrate for action selection in primates. These studies illustrate the 
interplay between analytic and synthetic approaches in the brain sciences, where biological 
investigations, predicated on existing models, generate data that matches key predictions while 
raising new questions for modellers to address.  In their first study, Houk et al. use human 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to show differential patterns of neural processing 
relating to sensory- and memory- guided movement sequences. Their results show patterns of 
activity in parts of cortex, basal ganglia and cerebellum consistent with these authorsÕ Ôdistributed 
processing modulesÕ hypothesis, developed, in part, on the basis of prior modelling 
investigations.  Of particular interest is the evidence of reduced activity in a basal ganglia input 
area (the caudate), which Houk et al. propose could be the consequence of presynaptic 
inhibitionÑa neuronal selection mechanism that they then demonstrate, using a computational 
model, to be both effective and energy efficient. In their second study, an electrophysiological 
investigation using monkeys, Houk et al. show that the basal ganglia act to select both the 
primary movement involved in orienting to a target, and also the much smaller corrective 
movements required to precisely locate that target.  Interestingly, changes in basal ganglia output 
were found to be of similar amplitude for both types of movement. This result suggests that in 
well-rehearsed tasks, the selection of primary movements may be in part ÔexportedÕ outside the 
basal ganglia (e.g. to cortex), whilst corrective movements, which cannot be predicted or learned, 
remain under full basal ganglia control.  
As larger-scale models are developed that encompass both cortical and sub-cortical 
mechanisms (e.g. Hazy et al., Frank et al., this issue), the dynamics of the interactions between 
these selective processes at different levels of the neuraxis (nervous system architecture) will 
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become better understood.  For instance, in mammals, and particularly in primates, basal ganglia 
loops involving the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) have long been identified with a general role in 
executive function (see e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001).  For Hazy et al. (this issue) loops through 
PFC provide modulation of working memory representations by taking advantage of a similar 
circuitry to that which, in more posterior loops, allows the selection of actions. These authors 
argue that the microanatomy of the PFC suggests the presence of multiple (perhaps 20,000 in 
humans) local neuronal groups, or  ÔstripesÕ, that could provide the substrate for encoding 
independent working memories. In their computational model (see also OÕReilly and Frank, 
2006) intrinsic, recurrent excitatory connections within each simulated stripe allow active 
representations to be maintained, whilst disinhibition, via a basal ganglia loop, can bring about 
the rapid updating of a specific representation. Learning occurs as the result of a dopamine-based 
reinforcement learning rule. In their present article, Hazey et al. propose two new extensions to 
this architecture. First, that basal ganglia loops involving the deeper layers of the PFC allow 
gating of the effects of working memory representations on processing elsewhere in the brain, 
and, second, that phasic noradrenaline release plays a role in regulating the balance between 
exploitation of learnt strategies and exploration of new alternatives. To validate their model, Hazy 
et al. have adopted the strategy of attempting to replicate, in the same basic model, empirical 
findings from a wide-range of working memory tasks. Data pertaining to each new phenomenon 
to be captured provides additional constraints and thus progressively more stringent tests of the 
model and its underlying functional hypotheses.  This validation approach can be seen as a 
general strategy for evaluating and extending computational models in cognitive science (Newell, 
1990; Gurney et al., 2004).  
 
The decomposition of control for behavioural sequencing 
The problem of action selection is often not a matter of making the best one-off decision, but of 
generating appropriate behavioural sequences whose net consequence is to achieve some 
desirable, but longer-term outcome. In ethology (see Seth, this issue), neuroscience and 
psychology (see Botvinick, this issue), robotics (Bryson, 2000; Crabbe this issue) and machine 
learning (e.g. Barto & Mahadevan, 2003), it has often been argued that behavioural sequences 
have a natural hierarchical decomposition. That is, that action selection is best organised to take 
place at multiple levels of abstraction from choosing among high-level objectives (e.g. whether to 
eat, drink, or rest) through to selecting among alternative movements that could serve the same 
specific, immediate goal (e.g. which grasp to use in picking up a cup).  
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Botvinick (this issue), presents an alternative perspective on this topic by arguing that 
behaviour that might appear to be hierarchically organised might be best implemented by a 
processing framework that does not have a hierarchical decomposition.  To motivate this proposal 
Botvinick describes a connectionist model of sequence learning based on Elman's (1990) 
recurrent neural network architecture. When required to learn the task of Ômaking a cup of 
coffeeÕÑwhich can be decomposed as a series of sub-tasks each containing a number of 
elementary actionsÑthe network achieves this goal without representing the hierarchical nature 
of the problem in an explicit way.  Botvinick argues that this non-hierarchical solution shows a 
context sensitivity and ability to take advantage of structural overlap between tasks that is also 
characteristic of natural sequential behaviour.  
As an existence proof of sequential learning without hierarchical decomposition, 
BotvinickÕs model tells us that the brain could solve such problems in a similar way, but is there 
any evidence that it actually does so?  On first examination the neuroanatomical data, as 
summarised by FusterÕs (1997) description of functional relationships between cortical regions, 
seems to point towards an explicitly hierarchical solution. Botvinick warns, however, against 
assuming that an anatomical hierarchy implies a functional one. In his model, adding intermediate 
layers of processing leads to a functional architecture in which higher levels preferentially encode 
broader temporal contexts, but in which some aspects of context are represented at all levels.  
This account thus may offer a reconciliation of hierarchical and non-hierarchical views, in which 
multiple layers of processing facilitate learning of structured tasks, whilst distributed 
representations at each level capture relevant context in a manner that allows more flexible 
expression of behaviour. 
 
Sub-cortical substrates for action selection 
The cortico-basal ganglia loops that are the focus of much of the research described above are 
known to exist alongside loops connecting the basal ganglia to a wide range of sub-cortical 
structures involved in sensorimotor co-ordination (McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet, & 
Redgrave, 2005).  The evolution of mammals saw a substantial increase in the role of the 
forebrain in action specification and control (Butler & Hodos, 1996) largely supplementing, 
rather than replacing, the sensorimotor functionality of these systems lower down the neuraxis. 
This complex layered architecture provides multiple levels of sensorimotor competence (Prescott 
et al., 1999), and the option to choose between sub-cortical systems that provide a rapid response 
to immediate contingencies, and cortical systems that provide sophisticated adjudication between 
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alternatives, taking greater account of context, past experiences, and likely future opportunities 
(McHaffie et al., 2005).  Key structures such as the subthalamic nucleus, which appears to 
provide a global, inhibitory Òhold your horsesÓ signal (see Frank et al. this issue), may have 
evolved, at least in part, in order to regulate this trade-off between speed and sophistication of 
action selection.   
Evidence from decerebrate and altricial animals, and from surgical interventions in patients 
with ParkinsonÕs disease, suggests the presence of a further substrate for action selection. 
Humphries, Gurney, & Prescott (this issue), argue that a centralized brainstem structure, the 
medial reticular formation (MRF), fits the Redgrave et al. (1999) criteria for an action selection 
mechanism.  The identification of the MRF with a possible action selection role has a long history 
that includes one of the first, if not the first, computational neuroscience models (Kilmer, 
McCulloch, & Blum, 1969).  Based upon the most recent anatomical data, Humphries, Gurney, 
and Prescott (2006) have described a structural model of the MRF intrinsic architecture which 
suggests that it is configured at the neuronal level as a Ôsmall-world networkÕ (Watts & Strogatz, 
1998)Ñimplying properties such as rapid cross-network synchronization, consistent stabilization, 
and persistent activity that could be useful for the representation and resolution of action selection 
competitions. In their present article, Humphries et al. further show that the intrinsic organization 
of the MRF connectivity may have evolved to minimize connection length for a characteristic 
pattern of network configuration that can be described as a series of stacked ÔclustersÕ.  These 
authors then set out a computational model that explores alternative hypotheses concerning the 
possible functional organisation of the MRF, concluding that an architecture in which the output 
of each cluster represents a sub-component of a complete behaviour appears most consistent with 
available evidence.  In other words, this model suggests that the co-activation of a set of MRF 
clusters would correspond with the expression of a co-ordinated behavioural response by the 
animal.  The relationship between selection systems in the MRF and basal ganglia remains to be 
worked out.  One possibility is that the MRF co-ordinates extended patterns of behaviour that can 
be selected Ôin totoÕ at the level of the basal ganglia. Another is that the MRF forms a parallel 
substrate for action selection, in keeping with the notion of layered control, such that damage to 
forebrain systems for action selection leaves intact a brain-stem network that is capable of 
preventing the most damaging forms of behavioural disintegration. 
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Disorders of action selectionÑclinical implications of action selection modelling 
As the above discussion suggests, modelling approaches to the understanding of natural action 
selection can give useful insights in circumstances where the normal flow of integrated behaviour 
becomes disrupted as a consequence of damage or disease. A cluster of neurological conditions 
that includes ParkinsonÕs disease (PD), schizophrenia, HuntingtonÕs disease, TouretteÕs 
syndrome, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
can be linked to the same cortico-basal ganglia circuits that have been identified above as key 
substrates for the selection of action.  Computational models of these substrates therefore have 
the potential to provide improved explanations for how these disorders arise and why particular 
patterns of symptoms are observed, and to serve as vehicles in which to investigate possible 
avenues for treatment.   
Building on a broad platform of earlier modelling work investigating motor control and 
decision making in intact basal ganglia loops, Frank et al. (this issue) explore the functional 
consequences of model manipulations that simulate specific types of brain damage or abnormality 
thought to underlie PD, decision making deficits in patients with frontal cortex damage, and 
ADHD.  For each condition, their model is able to explain much of the observed symptomatology 
and also to suggest novel predictions that can be tested at the neural or behavioural level.  For 
instance, with respect to PD, Frank et al. present a unifying computational hypothesisÑreduced 
dynamic range in dopaminergic modulation of the basal gangliaÑthat explains a range of motor 
and cognitive deficits seen in this disease. On the basis of their model, Frank et al. were also able 
to make predictions about the effects of dopamine medications on learning that were later verified 
experimentally, and to make suggestions about the likely impact of deep brain stimulation (a 
surgical treatment for PD) on cognitive processes. These authors further propose that by 
providing an improved characterisation of the function of different circuit components (e.g. the 
various intrinsic basal ganglia pathways), computational modelling could facilitate the 
development of targeted treatments for the motor deficits seen in PD that have fewer negative 
side-effects on patientsÕ cognitive and emotional capabilities. The aetiology of ADHD is poorly 
characterized compared to that of PD, nevertheless, for such conditions modelling can serve as a 
powerful aid to theory development. For instance, by investigating the consequences, in terms of 
model behaviour, of candidate causal factors, Frank et al. show that a cluster of symptoms 
associated with ADHD could result from a combination of reduced dopaminergic modulation of 
the basal ganglia and abnormal patterns of norepinephrine release in cortex.  
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The relevance of computational neuroscience models for understanding brain disorders 
involving action selection is also considered by Houk et al. (this issue), focusing particularly on 
schizophrenia. Like Frank et al., these authors emphasize that success in understanding these 
complex neurological disorders will most likely require models at multiple levels of analysis from 
biophysically-detailed models of cellular processes through to systems-level models, of the type 
we have focused on in this issue, that can link neurophysiological systems to observable 
behaviour. 
 
Perceptual selection in decision-making 
Action selection can be mediated not only by motor control systems but also by perceptual 
systems.  For example, mechanisms of selective attention (Posner, 1980) can guide action 
selection by linking a specific motor output to one stimulus among a range of stimuli. The issue 
of perceptual selection is raised by a number of articles in this issue, including Bogacz et al. (this 
issue) and Stafford and Gurney (this issue).  Consider the problem of detecting coherent motion 
in a cloud of otherwise randomly moving dots. A popular solution to this problem is provided by 
the leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001), which proposes 
that during decision making, noisy evidence supporting each of a range of alternatives is 
accumulated. A significant feature of this solution is that it can be shown to be optimal, i.e. under 
certain conditions the LCA model performs as well as is theoretically possible (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). Bogacz et al. (this issue) review various neural implementations of the LCA 
model from the perspective of optimality, and describe extensions to this work which show that 
nonlinear neuronal mechanisms can perform better than linear mechanisms in terms of speed of 
decision making between multiple alternatives. This result raises the interesting hypothesis that 
nonlinearities in neuronal response functions may have evolved at least in part as a result of 
selective pressures favouring rapid decision making.  
Bogacz et al. next extend the LCA framework beyond perceptual selection to account for 
so-called Ôvalue-basedÕ decisions in which alternatives are compared on the basis of their match 
to a set of internal motivations as well as to sensory signals.  They discuss two examples of 
apparent irrationality (see above and Houston et al., this issue): risk-aversion, where humans and 
animals prefer the less risky of two alternatives that are equated for expected value, and 
preference reversal, where the preference order between two alternatives can be reversed by the 
introduction of a third, irrelevant, choice option. The LCA model can account for these 
phenomena given a nonlinear utility function which is applied to the difference in value between 
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each alternative and a ÔreferentÕ which may correspond to the present (or expected) state of the 
decision maker. 
Stafford and Gurney (this issue) focus on the Stroop task, in which subjects have to name 
the ink colour of letter strings that spell out the name of a (congruent or incongruent) colour.  
Previously, Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) showed that a model similar to the LCA 
model just described could account for the basic Stroop phenomenon. Stafford and Gurney show 
that by introducing a response selection method based on a previous model of the basal ganglia 
(Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001), additional empirical data can be accounted for, making 
certain cognitive interpretations of the Stroop result (e.g., speed of processing) less likely.  This 
study highlights the notion that the neural mechanisms of selection can apply equally to both 
perceptual and motor domains. It also shows how models incorporating relevant neuroanatomy 
can usefully extend models based primarily on computational principles. 
 
The units of selection 
The impact of perception on action selection highlights the problem of specifying precisely what 
a ÔselectionÕ mechanism selects. As noted above, for Cisek (this issue), visual processing helps 
specify potential actions and these potential actions compete against each other for further 
processing in a competition that is continually biased by ongoing sensory input: action selection 
and action specification occur concurrently. Cisek argues that the functional architecture for 
behaviour might then be best understood as a set of competing, nested, sensorimotor loops, 
drawing parallels to some classic notions from ethology and to more recent insights from 
synthetic approaches such as behaviour-based robotics (Brooks, 1991) and active perception (e.g. 
Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995). Along similar lines, Seth (this issue) argues that there has been 
significant confusion in the Ôartificial lifeÕ literature as to the units of selection.  Although there is 
considerable consensus that perception is integral to the ÔactionsÕ that are selected, the behaviour 
categories that seem apparent to an external observer may have no correlates within the control 
mechanism itself.  What the observer terms action-selection behaviour arises from the interaction 
of agent-side mechanisms with the environment. When this interaction is subsequently 
categorized by an external observer, what appear to be multiple different actions may actually 
emerge from a single internal mechanism. This can lead to an overly complex assessment of the 
agentÕs own capacities (Simon, 1969).  To illustrate this argument, Seth describes a simple model 
in which action selection arises from the joint activity of parallel, loosely coupled sensorimotor 
processes.  
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Action selection in social contexts 
In nature, action selection is rarely purely an individual matter; rather, adaptive action selection 
usually involves a social context. As mentioned above, Seth (this issue) shows that the apparently 
irrational behaviour described by HerrnsteinÕs (1961) Ômatching lawÕ can, in fact, be optimal in a 
semi-social context. This result illustrates that action selection behaviour that is adaptive in an 
environment that includes competing conspecifics may be ÔirrationalÕ in an isolated individual.    
It is important to note that in SethÕs model the individuals are not explicitly societalÑthere 
are no direct costs or benefits associated with social interactions.  Agents in the model only 
interact indirectly via their effects on resource distribution in the environment.  Bryson et al. (this 
issue) investigate a similarly minimalist model of factors that influence the troop structure of 
primate species. The organization of primate societies has been characterized as ranging between 
egalitarian and despotic extremes (Thierry, Singh, & Kaumanns, 2004; van Schaik, 1989). Using 
an agent-based model, encompassing both individual motion and social conflict, Hemelrijk (2000, 
2002, 2004) has sought to account for this observed variation in social organization by 
manipulating a single variableÑthe level of violence in aggressive encounters.  In their present 
article, Bryson et al. replicate this model, then attempt to validate it against data from a well-
studied set of closely-related primate species, the macaques (genus Macaca).  In so doing they 
find several discrepancies between the model and their target systems, that lead them to at least 
partially reject the Hemelrijk model as a hypothesis of macaque behaviour.  On the other hand, 
they also show that when the model is altered, in a way that takes into account their critique, 
some of HemelrijkÕs original findings still hold.  Bryson et al. therefore make both a contribution 
to the theory of macaque social behaviour, and a methodological point by demonstrating the 
accessibility and robustness of simulation-based theory building. 
 Simulations have also been used to account for more precise quantitative descriptions of 
social behaviour. Pratt, Sumpter, Mallon, and Franks (2005) have recently demonstrated a model 
of a hypothesis of how one species of ant, Temnothorax albipennis, determines when and where 
to move a colony to a new nest.  Here a highly distributed algorithm with no central arbiter 
reliably results in a single nest being chosen which is likely to be optimal for a weighted 
consideration of a set of criteria (e.g. capacity of nest, defendability of entrance).  The action 
selection of the individuals affects the action selection of the colony. In this issue, Sellers, Hill, 
and Logan look to account for group action selection for navigation and resource consumption on 
a much larger scale.  They produce a simulation mapping the set of habitats in the precise range 
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of a particular troop of baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus), then try to replicate their annual 
patterns of foraging. The primary goal of this model is to determine the mechanism by which the 
troop as a whole chooses a direction to go in, given that this must reflect the needs of individuals 
in the troop (which cannot, of course, be fully negotiated or understood by the other animals).  
The assumption is that there is essentially a "voting mechanism" where if a critical number of 
agents move in one direction, then the entire troop will follow.  The model is evaluated by 
comparing the amount of time the real and virtual troops spend in various foraging environments 
at various times of the year. As might be expected from such an ambitious model, the outcome 
does not perfectly match the real data, but there is sufficient commonality that where differences 
exist, they motivate topics of research for field biologists to attempt to explain. For example, is 
there an undiscovered disadvantage to foraging near a vlei (African wetland)?  Or would another 
model of collective action arbitration better capture the data?   
 Finally, Laver and Schilperoord (this issue) examine an instance of social action selection 
for which there is a fairly well-understood centralized selection mechanismÑvoting in a 
democratic society.  Yet although in this case we know how the final social arbitration is 
determined, we do not know how individual voters choose their parties, nor how parties choose 
their platforms. These authors start from a standard political-science assumptionÑthat a multi-
dimensional space can be defined by both voter and party positions along issue vectors, and that 
voters will vote for the party nearest them in that space.  They then examine the way parties 
develop new positions, modelling & hypothesizing four ÔspeciesÕ of party: parties that seek 
ÔopenÕ positions, parties that take the average position of their voters, parties that ÔstickÕ to their 
platforms, and parties that chase the positions of more successful parties.  In previous work, 
Laver (2005) successfully modelled the trajectories of voting and position histories of Irish 
political parties.  In their present article, Laver and Schilperoord extend this earlier model to 
encompass party birth and death and to model citizen discontentment.  Their results include an 
explanation for situations in which parties tend to migrate towards the centre of the issue space, 
and how this increases the average level of citizen discontentment with their representation. 
 
Modelling Strategies 
As is clear from the above discussion, the contributions within this theme issue make use of a 
wide range of modelling strategies.  At one end of the spectrum, Houston et al. present analytic 
mathematical models in support of their arguments. While Bogacz et al. also use mathematical 
formalisms, they do so in order to analyze a series of simple neuronal network models from a 
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normative perspective. A similar strategy is pursued by Crabbe, with the distinction that 
normative analysis is applied to a formalized agent-based model in which sensory data is 
transformed into motor output, and not to idealized neural network models. Instead of using 
mathematical formalisms to establish optimality, Seth applies numerical optimization techniques 
(e.g., genetic algorithms, Mitchell, 1997) to agent-based models. Although genetic algorithms 
cannot guarantee optimality, they nevertheless allow model behaviour to be interpreted from a 
normative perspective.  A practical advantage of this approach is that models can incorporate 
subtle but significant agent-environment interactions; conceptually, such models help bridge the 
divide between agent-based modelling and optimality modelling. 
Particularly well represented in the present issue are mechanistic computational 
neuroscience models of the neural substrates of action selection. A primary advantage of 
mechanistic modelling is that neurobiological detail can be incorporated to an arbitrary degree, 
allowing specific predictions to be made with regard to empirical data (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; 
Gurney et al., 2004). The models included in this issue are mostly at a relatively high level of 
abstraction (e.g. Cisek, Hazy et al., Frank et al., Humphries et al., Stafford and Gurney, this issue) 
in that they incorporate constraints such as the gross functional anatomical organisation between 
and within brain regions, and are typically composed of relatively simple Ôleaky-integratorÕ style 
units whose operation often stands for that of relatively large neuronal ensembles. It is important 
to note the limitations of such models in that many, possibly critical, characteristics of real neural 
processing are passed over at this level. The contribution of Houk et al. serves to illustrate this 
problem by showing that a relatively low-level detailÑthe location of synaptic contacts on basal 
ganglia input neuronsÑcan have significant implications for network function. However, 
neurobiological specificity is not necessarily required for mechanistic models to make useful 
contributions. The connectionist model described by Botvinick demonstrates that significant 
insights, in this case into the utility of hierarchical organisation, can be obtained by exploring the 
functional capabilities of neural-like processing architectures that are not intended to directly 
mimic specific structural features of the brain. 
 Agent-based modelling, which is used by both Seth and Crabbe to investigate normative 
models of action selection, is put to a different, but equally productive use in the articles 
concerned with action selection in social groups. Bryson et al. and Sellers et al. focus on 
incorporating biological details into agent-based models in order to generate specific predictions. 
These authors view their models as well-specified scientific hypotheses that can be tested against 
empirical data using standard statistical procedures. Laver and Schilperoord demonstrate both the 
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generality and the broadening acceptance of agent-based modelling by showing its current 
standard of use in the social sciences.  Note that here the spatial aspects of agent-based modelling 
have become metaphorical, yet the outcome is still substantive quantitative results.  
The methodological practice of sharing research resources can benefit not only the wider 
scientific community but also the contributors of the resource (Gleditsch, Metelits, & Strand, 
2003; King, 1995). For this theme issue most of the models of natural action selection are 
provided, in source code form or similar, as electronic supplements to their respective articles.  
We are grateful to the authors for their enthusiastic support of this methodological research 
standard and urge interested readers to use this material to replicate, evaluate and extend the work 
presented here. 
 
Conclusion 
The scientific study of action selection integrates a broad range of topics including, but not 
limited to, neuroscience, psychology, ecology, ethology, and even political science.  These 
domains have in common a complexity that invites the development and deployment of advanced 
modelling techniques drawn from computer science, artificial intelligence, and artificial life.  Our 
goal for this special issue has been to collect and showcase some of the most exciting research in 
the biological sciences currently being performed using action-selection modelling techniques. As 
we have seen, this research promises to illuminate many important questions such as: why 
animals, including humans, sometimes act irrationally; how damage to neural selection substrates 
can lead to debilitating neurological disorders; and how action selection at the level of the 
individual impacts on the organisation of societies. In addition, this theme issue has sought to 
foster a cross-disciplinary fertilisation of concepts, tools, and modelling techniques. We hope that 
its lasting impact will be reflected not only in an improved scientific understanding of behaviour, 
but also in an enhanced methodological tool suite for the biological sciences. 
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